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THE FEASIBILITY OF A ZONE OF PEACE

Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates
Asia.

This ocean is the key to the seven seas.

In the 21st century the destiny of the world
will be decided on its waters.

Alfred Mahan

P. R. Kendrick
May, 1985

Starting in 1964 there has been a movement to declare the
Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace."

In an age when many in the world

feel threatened by the potential of nuclear holocaust this is not
striking in and of itself.

What the Zone of Peace proposal

provides is more valuable than the actual resolution.

Empirically,

it is obvious that nuclear free zones and peace zones have little
validity.

Historically, the weak have been vanquished by the

powerful; their proclaimed neutrality notwithstanding.
Consequently, a study of the peace movement in the Indian Ocean may
be utilized to investigate why proclamations which attempt to
restrict military involvement in a given region are unworkable.
A study of the peace movement in the region rapidly moves
toward discussion of the military posture of the United States and
the Soviet Union.

Many littoral states argue that a removal of

superpower forces would inevitably result in regional concord.
This, as we shall see, is unlikely.

This remote ocean is actually

an area of high intrigue and endemic political maneuver.

This

paper will focus on the presence of the superpowers in the region,
as well as that of China.

Other western states with an interest

will also be considered.

The prospects for peace amongst the

littoral states (should the superpowers abandon the Indian Ocean),
will also be examined.

Lastly, some analysis will be provided

which will identify major problems with attempts to proclaim any
area of the world as a zone of peace.
It was first proposed that the Indian Ocean be designated as a
zone of peace at a conference of nonaligned heads of state which
met in Cairo in 1964.

The proposal was made again at the 1970

nonaligned conference at Lusaka and a year later in Singapore.
Later in 1971, due to the initiative of Sri Lanka, the concept was
adopted as U.N. Resolution 2832.

It called for,

uThe Great Powers, in conformity with this declaration,
to enter into immediate consultations with littoral
states of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halting

the further escalation and expansion of their military
presence in the Indian Ocean; (b) Eliminating from the
Indian Ocean all bases, disposition of nuclear weapons
and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation
of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean
conceived in the context of great power rivalry.»l
The proposal has been discussed periodically, but the last
scheduled meeting in 1981 was cancelled because no consensus
could be reached amongst the participicants. 2 (In fact,
there was some discussion that India's detonation of a nuclear
device might have destroyed the Zone of Peace concept.)3
Based on the Zone of Peace proposal, the Soviets and
the U.S. met to discuss force limitations as late as 1978.
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Although these talks will be dealt with later it is interesting to
note that the two sides have not been able to agree on what
constitutes the Indian Ocean. 4 The u.s. is reluctant to deal
with the Soviets in reaction to their recent invasion of
Afghanistan and other smaller, albeit generally nonhostile (if one
ignores Cuban intervention), military incursions in the region.
The Soviets are clearly concerned with the u.S. presence on Diego
Garcia.

To further complicate the situation, both major powers

wish to preserve their traditional rights to freedom of navigation
on the high seas.

At the same time, the littoral states

unaminously supported U.N. Resolution 2832.

However, these states

continuously curry favor with whichever major power is perceived to
be most dominant at the time.
Prior to delving into the region from the perspective of
individual states, it will be beneficial to attempt to define the
Indian Ocean.

At the outset it should be recognized that the

concept of an Indian Ocean is really a convenient way to describe a
large body of water. 5

Generally speaking, the ocean is located

between latitudes 30 degrees north and 40 degrees south, and
longitudes 20 degrees west and 115 degrees east.

The littoral

states surrounding this tropical ocean are generally poor and
over-populated.

"Politically, it comprises a complex system of

states existing in various conditions of order and disorder."6

A

brief look at a chart discloses this to be the most enclosed of the
world's oceans. The four entrances are via: ( 1 ) the Red Sea,
(2)

(4)
the Malacca Strait, ( 3 ) the Cape of Good Hope, and

from the south of Australia.

Although smaller than the Atlantic

and Pacific Oceans, its size is considerable.

For example, from

Cape Town in South Africa to Fremantle, Australia is 4,700 miles.
-3-

7

Historically, the region has always been influenced by sea
power. 8 The sea routes of the Indian Ocean have played an
important part in the spice trade, and the region itself has been
an important source of raw material.

From the 4th century B.C. to

the 5th century A.D. Indian shipping was predominant.

Control of

the ocean then shifted to Sumatra until China became the preeminent
power around 1200 A.D.

The Chinese control was essentially

mercantilist and her control ended with the arrival of Vasco da
Gama in 1498. 9 Da Gamals arrival initiated the ongoing pattern
of outside control.

Portugal maintained control until the British

became the mightiest naval power in the 18th century.l0

Both

western forces maintained their positions of power by controlling
the entrances to the Indian Ocean.

The British presence was so

overwhelming that the ocean was considered a "British Lake."

On

July 26, 1956 the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal cast
grave doubts on the future effectiveness of any British-led
peacekeeping role in the area. l l In January of 1968 the British
left the ocean and today two outside powers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, vie for control.
The current situation is markedly different than that of the
past.

Prior to the British withdrawal the region was controlled by

a single powerful state.

Currently, the United States and the

Soviet Union both project power into the area.

Given the

importance of the region other nations, including France and China,
also maintain an interest 1n the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore,

several of the littoral states are engaged in an ongoing military
expansion, while others face serious problems of subversion,
insurgency, and starvation.

The impetus to establish the ocean as
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a Zone of Peace must be balanced against the increasingly complex
equations that continue to manifest themselves in the littoral
states.
In terms of materials, the region has 60 percent of the world
oil reserve.

The littoral states also have a world monoply in the

production of rubber, tea, and jute.

The Indian Ocean trade routes

are also exceptionally important in world shipping; especially for
beryl, chrome, ore, antimony, asbestos, copper, columbium, lead,
nickel, and uranium. 1 2 The vitally important ocean is not rated
well for polymetallic nodules, however, " ... as these occurrences

may average less than what is generally stated to be a minimum
cut-off grade. 1I 1 3
The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is a concept not likely to
bear fruit in the near future.

Although this proposal has been

presented several times, the strategic importance of the region as
well as the political uncertainties in the littoral states make it
an ocean with far too much significance to be ignored by the
world's major powers.

As will be explained, the Indian Ocean is

not only of major importance as an oil and mineral route, but it is
a hotbed of political maneuvering as well.
UNITED STATES POSITION
The United States established a permanent position in the
Indian Ocean with the creation of the Middle East Force in 1949.
Given the location of the ocean the only effective method to show
the U.S. flag in the area was through the naval forces.

The

domestic perception behind the establishment of this force
recognized that in order to be a dominant power and thus be able to
influence local political decisions, a signal must be shown to
. indicate a willingness to support our a11ies. 1 4 The Persian Gulf
-5-

was the logical location to place the naval contingent because of
oil production as well as its proximity to the Soviet Union.
Although our energy needs are not as reliant on Middle East oil
as are Europe and Japan, it is projected that the U.S. shall have
at least some dependence on this source through the remainder of
this century.

Consequently, U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is

there in large part to protect the eight to nine million barrels of
oil that pass through the Straits of Hormuz and upon which our
allies are so vitally dependent.

The extremely large oil capacity

of the region explains why Congress has always acted so favorably
to the force.
The U. S. Middle East Force has been an expensive creation.
Generally there is a command ship supported by two destroyers in
the Gulf at all times.

For every ship in the Gulf, it takes a

total of two or more constantly enroute to maintain the presence.
The use of Bahrain as a base is also tenuous.

While there was a

permanent agreement until 1971, the U.S. now depends on an
executive agreement which limits a ship's days in port to a total
of 120.

(In 1971 Bahrain asked the U.S. to leave because of its

desire to support the Arab Oil Boycott.)15

Although the cost of

maintaining the Middle East Force is relatively high, given the
limited number of ships present, it is done to act as a check on
the Soviet Union as well as acts of terrorism from Iraqui or
Iranian forces.

MIn practice, the Soviets have been unwilling to

risk a major confrontation involving U.S. Armed Forces, whatever
their size, whereas they might be tempted to risk a fait accompli
in the Western Indian Ocean in the absence of any U.S. forces. M1 6
The current U.S. Policy is to supplement the three Middle East
Force ships with periodic carrier deployments.
-6-

Usually, a task

force will deploy to the North Western Indian Ocean three times a
year for thirty-five to sixty-five days at a time.

During these

deployments, the opportunity to show the flag is utilized by making
port calls.

Additionally, exercises with Central Treaty

Organization (CENTO) and Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Council (ANZUS)
Forces are conducted at these times.

While the surge capability

enables the U.S. to overwhelm the typical Soviet naval force in the
ocean, the failure to establish a permanent presence has frequently
been problematical.
Congress has never favored a large U.S. presence in the Indian
Ocean.

While support for the Middle East force has consistently

remained strong there have been numerous opinions on whether to
establish a strong U.S. presence in the remainder of the ocean.
Prior to 1970 the U.S. was far too preoccupied with the Persian
Gulf while neglecting the littoral states.

The problems with that

policy came to light with the Pakistan-India conflict in 1973.

The

United States and the Soviets both deployed large task forces to
provide moral support to Pakistan and India respectively.

However,

" ... the U.S. history of comparative disinterest in the region
relative to the Soviet history of activity meant that the belated
U.S. effort was much less credible."17

Our lack of a permanent

force created the dangerous impression with U.S. allies in the
littoral that we might simply sail away when American concerns were
satisfied.
As the U.S. Navy is not permanently deployed in the Indian
Ocean, the small island of Diego Garcia has become a vital part of
our strategy in the region.
the ocean are immense.

The advantages of a permanent base in

In the first case a base provides important
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logistical support.

No less important is the impression that our

permanent commitment conveys to friendly countries.

Yet the

creation of the base proved difficult despite its obvious
practicality.

When President Ford first proposed the establishment

of the island base, strong congressional opposition was
encountered.

John Culver of Iowa, with support from Alan Cranston,

Edward Kennedy, and Claiborne Pell, introduced the Culver
Amendment.

In this amendment it was proposed that no funds be

allocated for the project unless the U.S. entered into Indian Ocean
naval arms limitations with the Soviets.

President Ford managed to

kill the amendment, given Soviet and Cuban intervention in the
littoral states, but this controversy highlights the often
ambiguous U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean. 1 8
Diego Garcia has been developed and is currently the heart of
the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy.

The island itself is fourteen

miles long by four miles wide with an area of ten square miles.

It

is currently capable of providing anchorage for a complete carrier
battle group.

More importantly, the 415,000 barrels of oil in

storage can support a battle group for thirty days without outside
support.

There is also a reinforced 12,000 foot runway which can

handle the largest military planes as well as extensive
communication facilities. 1 9 Its central location makes it the
Malta of the Indian Ocean.

The location is also relatively safe

from littoral state air attack and immune from land intervention.
Still another advantage is that the island is outside of the
typhoon belt.
This is not to suggest that the base on Diego Garcia is not
without liabilities.

uThe U.S. strategic axis in the Indian Ocean

is centered around Diego Garcia.

But this axis would be complete
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only if South Africa (at Simonstown) and western Australia
(Cockburn Sound and Northwest Cape) controlled the flanks on either
side of the Indian Ocean. u20

Its isolated location also makes it

susceptible to a determined Soviet effort to cut it off.

Lastly,

the fact that the Indian Ocean 1s the World1s smallest does not
eliminate the long distance from Diego Garcia to other areas in
which the U.S. has vital interests.
The base is not the only aspect of U.S. strategy.

Rather than

keep a permanent naval force in the ocean, the Rapid Deployment
Force (RDF) has been created.

While palliative to Congressional

concerns, there is serious question as to the military significance
of the plan.

In theory, merchant ships loaded with military stores

can be sent to a crisis area, and offload U.S. troops in the area
who can supply themselves and be ready to intervene in a crisis.
The ships utilized by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) are
controversial because they require a conventional pier on which to
offload supplies.
find.

In a crisis that necessity may prove hard to

It is also widely recognized that the RDF is not capable of

supporting a force that could match that of the Soviets, although
it might be feasible in a small scale conflict.

The benefit of the

RDF probably does not rest in its military capability but rather it
serves U.S. interests by reinforcing the concept of commitment to
friendly nations of the littoral.
While the advantages to be gained by creating a permanent force
have helped show U.S. allies of our ongoing concern in the affairs
of the Indian Ocean, our strategic position suffers from some
dramatic difficulties.

The U.S. presence is in part designed to

indicate the importance of sea lanes to Moscow.

Yet the U.S. has

virtually no capacity to operate effectively in the Cape of
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Good Hope.
N •••

If the Suez Canal is closed, the Cape becomes

perhaps the most vital strategic link in the trading patterns

of the modern world. N21

Furthermore, the naval complex at

Simonstown is a modern, well-equipped base which is capable of
providing the types of extensive repairs that would be required in
a war.

To further emphasize the importance of this route, it

should be recognized that 56 percent of the ships which travelled
around the Cape when the Suez Canal was closed were owned by NATO
states.

That fact, coupled with the capabilities of the shipyard,

helps stress the strategic importance of South Africa to the
U.S. 22
The importance of Simonstown is further explained by the need
to refuel ships which travel via the Cape from the East coast of
the

u.s.

to the Indian Ocean.

If the Suez Canal were closed it is

likely that U.S . destroyers would be compelled to transit the Cape
during times of crises without supporting ships.

Given current

agreements, U.S. destroyers would have to go from Luanda in Angola
(a tenuous fueling agreement) to Mozambique.

That distance (2700

miles) would force a destroyer to drop to 25 percent of its fuel
level when 50 percent is the normally accepted safe operating
limit. 23 From a military standpoint it would be highly practical
to use the base at Simonstown in a routine basis.

While in port

this would provide the added benefit of establishing a working
relationship with the South African Navy.

The insurmountable

problem is that a policy of cooperation with South Africa would
lead to an

N •••

outcry from elements willing to sacrifice the

nation's strategic interests for considerations of domestic
politics and ideology."24

It is interesting to consider whether

the U.S. policy would change if the Soviets, or one of their
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allies, closed the Suez Canal.
On a more encouraging note, the British have maintained an
agreement with South Africa to utilize their facilities in times of
crisis.

In a very grave international situation it is conceivable

that the U.S. might be able to overcome domestic opposition and use
British coattails to gain access to Simonstown and its
facilities. 25
The Suez Canal is also a choke point of considerable
importance.

Currently, the only true military capability the U.S.

has in the region is the Middle East force in the Persian Gulf.
The significance of this force is virtually meaningless outside of
the Gulf.

There is virtually no U.S. air capability (limited air

facilities are available in Djibouti) to speak of, thus making a
possible move to the abandoned British sub base on Masirah a
strategically important consideration.

Located off the coast of

Oman, an improved airfield on this island could provide air cover
to ships going through the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and
the Red Sea. 26 While air cover alone would not be effective in
stopping Soviet military action, it is yet another signal that the
U.S. takes the Indian Ocean seriously and, by virtue of a permanent
presence, one available to our allies should they need military
assistance.
It should also be recognized that the Suez Canal provides the
Soviets a very fast route for ships from their Black Sea fleet to
the Indian Ocean.

Coupled with the ships they constantly have

deployed in the region (an average of nine), the Suez Canal
provides them with a means to rapidly increase their naval
presence.

They also have port availabilities in Yemen and on the

island of Socotra.

Thus, in time of war, the Soviets could easily
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control the entrance from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

It

would also be relatively simple to place mines throughout the
Straits of Malacca, thus forcing the U.S. units of the 7th fleet to
enter the Indian Ocean from the wide expanses south of Australia.
Therefore, while the U.S. has taken some measures to improve its
position, both the Cape route and the facilities in South Africa
might prove crucial in a conflict with the Soviet Union.
Consequently, the U.S. position vis a vis the Soviet Union in
the Indian Ocean is less than overwhelming .

On a routine basis the

Soviets have more naval ships operating there than does the United
States.

Ship Days in the Indian Ocean

Soviet Union

Year

United States

1965

0

1,100

1969

4,200

1,100

1972

8,800

1, 100

1974

10,500

2,600

1976

7,300

1,400

1978

8,400

2,900

1979

7,600

4,200

The Soviets also have

II

... an advantage which the United States does

not have--they are a regional, albeit not a littoral, state of the
Indian Ocean. 27 The U.S. military presence is not a "paper
11

tiger,· but in a full scale conflict any U.S. units would be hard
pressed to defend themselves unless a carrier battle group happened

I

to be present.

I

-12-

I

I

which are nuclear-powered or employ nuclear weapons to call at her
ports.

As the U.S. will neither confirm nor deny the presence of

nuclear weapons, New Zealand has halted port visits for all U.S.
naval vessels.

The immediate reaction from Washington was to

impose economic sanctions to encourage New Zealand to change its

policy for fear it will affect the basing of missiles in Europe.
Whether New Zealand's policy will influence similar behavior in the
littoral states is open to question, but there seems to have been
no reaction, favorable or unfavorable, in the region.

The speed

with which the U.S. responded to the ban will certainly send a
signal to our friends that this kind of behavior will not be
tolerated.

Also, while the U.S. is gaining good will by sending

massive amounts of food to Ethiopia, the Soviets have been slow to
send aid and are viewed as violent aggressors in Afghanistan.
Anti-nuclear sentiment may be popular throughout the world today,
but it is doubtful that friends of the U.S. would risk losing her
support, especially in light of recent efforts to establish viable
long-term commitments in the region.
SOVIET UNION
The British abandoned the Indian Ocean in January of 1968.

A

mere two months later the Soviets commenced their first major
deployment to the region.

A Sverdlov class cruiser, Kashin class

destroyer, two Kruppy class guided missile destroyers and a support
ship all from Vladivdstok participated in a four-month "show the
flag

The speed and timing of this deployment indicate
prior planning on the part of the Soviet Union. 30 They have
ll

cruise.

maintained a permanent naval presence since that time, their force
generally consisting of six combatants and three support ships.
-14-

Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean is consistent with article
four of the 1940 Four Power Pact Secret Protocol in which Russia
stated

u •••

that its territorial aspirations centre south of the

national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the
Indian Ocean .... "31

Although not generally included in the

tabulation of ships, due to their invisibility the Soviets also
deploy a large number of submarines in the ocean.

The result has

propelled the Soviets into a major force among many of the poorer
littoral nations, especially Africa.
The most frequent justification for naval presence has the
Soviets contending that a strong anti-submarine capability was, and
is, required to offset American deployment of ballistic missile
submarines. 32 However, the preponderance of her ships are
anti-air or surface capable, suggesting that the ballistic threat
might never materialize and, thus, they have defined other
functions to fulfill; or more likely they used the excuse of
strategic threat to enter the region in the first place.

While the

Soviet Navy has participated in a variety of activities in the
ocean, the thrust of her efforts has been in assisting littoral
states and showing the flag, further suggesting that the presence
of force is political rather than military.
The U.s. has never revealed the patrol areas of her missile
submarines, and the operating areas of these boats is one of the
most closely held secrets.

There are, however, some facts

available which tend to cast doubt on the feasibility of the Indian
Ocean as a submarine deployment area.

In the first place there are

no submarine tenders permanently deployed there.

The nearest

submarine bases are either Holy Loch in Scotland or Hawaii's Pearl
Harbor, with permanent tender availability at Guam.
-15-

Furthermore,

missile patrols are known to last approximately three months.

As

the transit times from established bases would consume a major
portion of the patrol period, the limited time on station lends
credence to the belief that the Indian Ocean is not widely, if at
all, used by U.S. ballistic submarines.

"Since they cannot be

operating in defense of the homeland, there is no strategic threat
against which to defend; the Russians must be doing something else
in the Indian Ocean.

As their actions to date have shown, this

'something else' is essentially political in character."33
There are several aspects of the Soviet efforts to establish
herself as a power in the Indian Ocean.

The U.s. wishes to offset

the Soviets, and the converse is true as well.

As mentioned

before, the Soviets have a major advantage by virtue of being a
regional power.

While the Soviets have established a relatively

large number of facilities in various nations upon which they can
depend for support, they have never established a permanent base.
Western dependence on bases has been a target of Soviet
condemnation since 1964 and has proved a powerful weapon in the
propaganda war. 34 While they own no bases, they did build the
facilities at Aden in Yemen and on the island of Socotra,
ostensibly for the use of the particular littoral states.

Of

course, the Soviet navy uses the bases almost exclusively.

The

Soviet Union is attacking the U.S. repeatedly for its use of Diego
Garcia while they conveniently ignore any of their own facilities
on client states' territories.
Russia, and her Cuban surrogates have also been quick to
intervene in a variety of locations.

These actions have further

helped solidify their position with client states for the use of
facilities.

The Soviet Union is also friendly with India due to
-16-

their mutual distrust of the Chinese.

Furthermore, "With the

intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the necessity for a secure,
all-weather, ice free, east-west route has become paramount. "35
Russia, like the United States, is involved in the Indian Ocean for
a variety of reasons; the foremost in each case being political.
Russia. in support of political ends, has been willing to intervene
in conflicts while the U.S. has not.

As Krushchev said,

" ... Communists fully support national wars of liberation as just
wars and march in the front rank with people waging liberation
struggle."36

This policy has tended to win support from poorer

nations while driving most of the wealthier states, which, for
obvious reasons wish to maintain the status quo, into the western
camp.
The Soviets have still managed to assemble a variety of ports
upon which they can depend.

Although India maintains that its

foreign policy is one of strict neutrality, it has certain
arrangements with the Soviet Union that it does not extend to
America.

India and Russia have signed a Treaty of Peace,

Friendship and Cooperation.
that the two nations

Y •••

Article IX of the treaty reads in part

shall immediately enter into mutual

consultations in order to remove such threat and to take
appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of
their countries."37

This treaty is a mutual agreement to provide

against incursion from their joint enemy, China.

Soviet actions in

the Indian Ocean are contrary to the stated Indian objective of
creating a Zone of Peace.

India tolerates the Soviet Union's

presence in the ocean out of necessity.

Hence, support for Soviet

naval vessels would probably be difficult in the absence of a
massive U.S. deployment, such as the presence of the 7th Fleet in
-17-

the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.

38

After the United States began to develop Diego Garcia, the
Soviets began to invest heavily in facilities at the port of
Berbera in Somalia.

Although they denied direct involvement for

quite some time, it was apparent that they were constructing an
immense shipyard.

The capabilities at Berbera included port

facilities, a barracks for 1,550 military personnel, a long-range
high-frequency communications station, a dry dock, fuel storage for
170,000 barrels of oil, a 4,800 meter runway capable of handling
all types of military aircraft, and storage for anti-air and
anti-ship missiles. 39 The Soviets no longer have access to the
port as they now support Ethiopia, but its construction is
informative as it clearly explains how they intend to deal with
Diego Garcia.
The Soviets have use of other facilities, none of which is as
immense as Berbera, but which in total provide them with extensive
capabilities.

On a small scale the Island of Mauritius has allowed

the Soviets to fly in relief fishing crews as well as providing
support to naval shiPping. 40 Although they permit both
superpowers to pay port visits, the Soviets clearly have an
advantage by virtue of establishing a precedent to do far more than
visit.

Also, there are the aforementioned ports in the Peoples'

Democratic Republic of Yemen and the massive sea anchorage
strategically located at Socotra.

At Dahlak, Ethiopia there is a

small naval complex, including an 8,500 ton dry dock.

The Soviets

also have innumerable buoys labeled "Property of the U.S.S.R." in
the Durban-Madagascar-Seyche1Ies Triangle. 41
While the Soviets have been quick to criticize the Indian Ocean
policy of the U.S., they sided with America in failing to support
-18-

the Zone of Peace proposal.

Both nations cited the imposition that

the Zone would have placed on traditional international legal
42 The interests of the two major
rights of freedom of the seas.
powers in the region are too vital for them to withdraw.

The U.S.

will maintain its presence to protect oil supplies, mineral routes,
and as a check on the Soviets.

The Soviets will stay to attempt to

win friends, keep the Chinese out, and act as a check on the
Americans and to provide an all-weather east-west route.

As was

noted by Henry Kissinger, "Geography alone ensures that the Soviet
navy will reamin in the Indian Ocean as long as the Soviet Union
remains a maritime power."43
It seems very doubtful that either power would be willing to
absent themselves from the region, despite the stated desires of
the littoral states.

Both nations have compelling reasons to

maintain their force levels.

Military force in the area can be

used by both states to help achieve desired outcome.

However, both

countries are aware of the high cost of direct intervention.

The

U.S. learned this fact in Vietnam while the Soviets are currently
learning the hard lessons in Afghanistan.

But again, both sides

are well aware that "the foreign policy orientation of many nations
around the Indian Ocean littoral will still be strongly influenced
by whatever country is regarded as the emerging power of the area;
and this will be measured largely in terms of whose naval presence
is the most pervasive."44

From the standpoint of the superpowers

it seems inconceivable that they would every abandon the Indian
Ocean and leave it to the vicissitudes of local nations.
CHINA
Most studies of outside presence in the Indian Ocean area focus
on the two superpowers.

The Chinese are also involved in
-19-

establishing zones of power with friendly littoral states.

Pro-

western observers concentrate on Moscow's plans but often neglect
to pay heed to Peking's interests and plans in the area.

China

attempts to reinforce the image that she alone is interested in the
poor nations.

There are wide disparities amongst different

littoral states in terms of wealth; and these differences are
exacerbated because some have oil which others .

China aids those

states with no oil and at the same time condemns both Russia and
the u.s. as exploitative. 45
The Oriental mind has always been something of an enigma to
western observers.
really after.

It is difficult to understand what China is

"While the Soviet Union is so busily engaged and is

orchestrating a global strategy, the Chinese communists have been
perhaps less spectacular but no less energetic."46

What becomes

evident is that the Chinese are pursuing the same strategy of
intervention as both superpowers.
When the Zone of Peace proposal was first introduced it
received rapid and enthusiastic support from China.

As China was

not then, nor is it now, a major maritime power, it had nothing to
lose by supporting the statement of peace.

Additionally, China

received two major advantages by vocally siding with the littoral
states; local support and a propaganda victory that enabled her to
cover her expansion in the region.

It is also important to

remember that China has enjoyed the support and popularity of much
of the Afro-Asian world for some time.

While supporting ·peace·

and lending assistance to third world states, it has been China's
position that armed imperialist states inevitably cause wars.
Conversely, arms in the hands of the "oppressed" who decide to wage
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the honorable fight for independence u • • • will constitute a force in
defense of peace. H47 Clearly, "peace" is open to different
interpretations.
At the same time China supports the Zone of Peace, the nation
has been making efforts to increase the size of its navy.

In

China's view, greater naval power (and, therefore, greater
presence) will help to develop more markets for Chinese goods,
build socialism, and ultimately support and encourage world
revolution. 48 For many years the Chinese army maintained
complete control of all military planning but recent indications
suggest the balance may be changing.

"The Peoples' Liberation Army

(PLA) Navy now seems to have considerable influence at the highest
levels of the Chinese leadership.u49
The goals of this emerging naval force seem to be directed
toward Soviet expansion.

China perceives four major missions for

the Soviet Union in Asia, which taken together are designed to
encircle China.

In the Indian Ocean region it is the Chinese

opinion that the Soviets intend to obtain access to the Persian
Gulf through Iraq and to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan (once
Afghanistan has been subdued).50

While these may indeed be

Soviet intentions, the practicality of achieving these goals is
doubtful.
to improve.

Whatever the reasons, China's naval capability continues
Currently, the Soviets rotate ships in the Indian

Ocean in the March/April and October/November time frame.

The

Chinese coordinate their naval maneuvers during these periods and
conduct surveillance as well.

China is not yet a blue water navy,

but the ongoing building program is giving China an ever expanding
naval presence with the stated goal of countering the Soviets.

UIn

addition, the leadership realizes that to obtain credibility on the
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international scene, China's potential enemies must recognize that
China does indeed have the intention and capability to project sea
power into the open-ocean arena. uSI
It is interesting that China as a strong supporter of the Zone
of Peace is now addressing the need for distant power projections.
Yet the fact remains that China has participated in militaristic
behavior extending beyond revolution in the past.

Although China

no longer gives any naval aid to Tanzania, in the past Chinese

money built up a small, yet effective, missile boat navy for that
state.

Also, when China tested her first ICBM (Inter-continental

Ballistic Missile), the landing point was in the Indian Ocean near
the island of Zanzibar.

Although China presents itself as the

protector of the third world interests " ... the testing of her first
ICBM in the Indian Ocean came under heavy criticism from the
littoral states of the region. uS2
China's policy in the Indian Ocean is somewhat of a dichotomy.
While frequently criticizing both superpowers for allegedly
attempting to establish hegemony over the littoral states, there is
no doubt that the main recipient of Chinese ire is the Soviet

Union.

Hence, China tacitly supports the United States and they
openly agree with the U.S. policy of supporting Pakistan. 53 At

the same time, China remains the only member of the U.N. Security
Council that is in favor of the Zone of Peace.

It seems likely

that China's recent overtures to the U.S. are motivated by a desire
to counterbalance the Soviet Union.

Ultimately, China would prefer

that both superpowers abandon the Indian Ocean, thus leaving the
littoral nations open to receive Chinese style revolution.

China

has criticized both superpowers for failing to adopt the "no first
use" stratagem of nuclear weapons, while stressing to the littoral

-22-

states that China does not deploy any nuclear weapons in the region.
When viewing U.S.-U.S.S.R. affairs vis a vis China it is wise
to remember the Chinese proverb "Sit on the mountain and watch the
tigers fight."56

China will continue to support U.S. policy to

some degree for the foreseeable future, but if the world situation
should change in a manner which is interpreted by China to indicate
a lesser threat, it is most probable that criticism of the u.S.
will increase.

Their policy in the past has been to practice

self-aggrandizement and they will undoubtedly continue to do so.
China's support of the Zone of Peace has not been without
qualification either.

Delegates to the Peace Convention there have

repeatedly taken issue with India as a co-sponsor of the U.N.
resolution.

As India is fairly friendly with the Soviets, and a

definite enemy of Pakistan, this is not surprising.

China has

publicly stated that India's actions are motivated " ... with the aim
of serving the Soviet Union in its contention with another
superpower for hegemony over the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan
sub-continent. u55
In sum, the strategy Peking has adopted will make them appear
as a benign friend, regardless of what happens.

With the exception

of their ICBM test, China has studiously avoided taking actions
which might be perceived as hostile by the poorer nations of the
littoral.

Peking strictly avoids intimating that it has any desire

for hegemony and supports egalitarian goals .

Their lack of truly

high technologically advanced machinery has also helped them with
the poor littoral states.

While Soviet and U.S. equipment is more

capable, it is also more complicated to operate, thus making the
simpler Chinese equipment more valuable to backward nations.
Lastly, China has created a situation in which they cannot lose
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esteem with poorer nations.

If the two superpowers do not divest

themselves of their interests in the region. then China will be
viewed as the benign. non-third-world ally of the downtrodden.

If

by some miracle the U.S. and Russia were to withdraw from the
region. China could proudly proclaim that the pressure they exerted
in supporting the Zone of Peace was a major factor in the
decessions of the superpowers.

In either case. China will have the

support of the poorer leftist-leaning states.
INDIA
India. as a spokesman for other littoral states. has adamantly
objected to big power presence in littoral affairs.

Many have

argued that when the British withdrew it left a vacuum that.
inexorably. had to be filled by outside power.

India rejects that

analysis and claims that littoral states want and deserve
self-determination.

India has criticized both superpowers but has

been mild in condemning Russian involvement.

As an Indian

newspaper editorialized in 1968. "The arrival of the Soviet Navy in
the Indian Ocean means that for the first time since Vasco da Gama.
western naval supremacy is faced with a serious challenge.- S6
India has spared no effort in justifying Soviet presence. although
they make it clear they would prefer an ocean void of foreign
influence.
It is argued that the primary basis for Russian intervention is
to counter the U.S. ballistic missile threat.

While the theory is

highly suspect. it remains the predominant Indian explanation.
Furthermore. they argue that the Soviets are present to keep the
expansion of the U.S. naval power in check.

This fails to account

for the Soviet deployments. which came before the American
deployment. but is consistent with their public and private
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criticism of U.S. naval bUild-up.57

Some of the Indian concern

with U.S. presence seems detached from reality; aOne of the

long-term objectives of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is to
influence the political and economic life of the littoral states by
threatening them with a massive nuclear attack on their densely
populated cities and newly established industrial centers. u58
Others argue that the U.S. desires to gain control of the ocean to
exploit for itself the riches of the sea beds, while independent
analysis suggests that the nodules in this sea are not rich enough
to be commercially feasible.

One concludes that these are

persuasive arguments designed to influence the emotional support of
littoral states rather than convince thoughtful observers.
Finally, some of the passionate attacks on the U.S. are motivated
out of anger because many Indians feel that the U.S. does not treat
their nation with the proper degree of respect. 59
India has repeatedly enunciated its neutrality.

They also have

pointed out that they have never allowed the Soviets any bases on
their soil.

One fact they neglect to mention is their willingness

to allow the Soviet navy's vessels access to dockyard facilities.
It does appear that the Soviets are granted more support than the
U.S., but some experts opine that India would prefer that both
superpowers withdraw so that India can institute its own form of
hegemony.

India also attacks the U.S. 's facility at Diego Garcia,

fully aware that America would lose important influence among the
littoral states if no permanent presence was maintained. 60 If
the United States were to leave the ocean, the Soviets might
possibly be willing to lessen their involvement, knowing that India
was to some degree supporting their philosophy in the region .
The stated Indian objective is to help develop a Zone of Peace,
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but they have at times expressed a desire to return to their
historical position of power and turn the Indian Ocean into an
Indian Lake. 6l uGeopolitical factors, historical lessons and
maritime tradition all impel India towards developing into a major
naval power in the Indian Ocean despite severe economic and
technological constraints.· 62 Partly in efforts to protect her
large exclusive economic zone and to work towards becoming a more
viable naval power, India conducted a 37 ship naval exercise in
1982.

Additionally, citing its perception of an ominous

'militarization of the Indian Ocean', India's government has
responded with a major fleet building program.

In 1984 India began

construction of a small aircraft carrier and should be capable of
deploying a battle group by 1990. 63

Ultimately, India's concept of a Zone of Peace seems to be more
a desire to control its namesake rather than to foster a spirit of
nonintervention and self-determination.

The condemnation of the

U.s. is quite strident when compared to what is said about the
Russians; but if both superpowers were to abandon the ocean, that
would best fit with India's ultimate goals.

However, India would

most likely pursue her brand of control of the region.

Most states

proclaim a desire to promote peace, but again it seems ·peace

N

has

many definitions.
AUSTRALIA

Sentiment has varied in Australia on the subject of military
power in the Indian Ocean as a check on potential Soviet
expansion.

The experience of Vietnam was not lost on the remainder

of the western world.

Many were uncertain about the need to have

military power for protection and Australians questioned the
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necessity of maintaining men under arms, too.

-As far as Australia

is concerned, however, the climate of opinion is such that anyone
who points to this uncertainty or suggests the need to build up
deterrent forces in being--and in good time--is taken to be a
crank ... and is regarded with loathing and derision by the
intelligentsia.

This climate of opinion is reinforced by most of

the media and by academia out of conformism and invincible
ignorance. p64 The demilitarization movement in Australia,
however, was never accepted by the majority.

There was, and is, to

this day, strong public opinion against the Soviet presence in the
Indian Ocean.

In fact, Gordon Freeth, a one-time liberal party

minister for external affairs, was forced from office when he
suggested that Australians not panic at the presence of Soviet
naval vessels in the ocean.

Although the Labor Government, which

lost power in 1976, was critical of the u.S. naval buildup in the
region, they continued the practice of close U.S.-Australian naval
cooperation.

Hence, despite some criticism of U.S. policy,

Australia has never abandoned its joint commitment in the
application of an Indian Ocean strategy.65
Australia has, in principle, supported the Zone of Peace.

At

the same time the Australians recognize that the inherent political
instability amongst the littoral states makes them attractive to
influence from outside powers.

"The strategic position (of the

Indian Ocean) must be seen in the context of an extension of the
competing interests of the superpowers as well as the interests of
other extra-regional powers including China, Japan, France, Britain
and the major littoral and regional states which have the capacity
p66
to influence regional relations.
In a government report,
Australia noted that all the littoral nations had supported the
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Zone of Peace.

However, only a few of them truly wished to see the

superpowers withdraw from the Indian Ocean.

This document

suggested that most littoral states felt that if one superpower
were present, it was in the best interest of peace to have the
other there as well.

More importantly, it was suggested that most

littoral nations felt that a complete withdrawal of the superpowers
would destabilize the ocean rather than engender an atmosphere
conducive to peace.

HA number of the littoral states harbor

suspicions that a regional escalation of military strength would
ensue with nations such as India competing to fill the vacuum and
dominate the region.

u67

While Australia is a dependable member of the western camp,
their analysis of the peace movement is representative of that of
many of the littoral states.

Supporting the Zone of Peace is one

thing, but its inception seems unlikely if neither of the
superpowers is inclined to leave the region.

More problems are

encountered when it is realized that the nations in question have
not been able to consolidate their proposals in a manner which is
satisfactory to all.
others are pro-Russia.

Lastly, some states are pro-west, while
These nations view peace in terms of their

particular political philosophy and seem unwilling to voluntarily
abandon ties with the nation which is most likely to help them stay
in power. 68
OTHER NATIONS

There are numerous states, other than the superpowers, which
might have a reason, as well as the means, to use force against a
littoral nation.

They include:

India, Pakistan, Japan, China,

Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Phillipines,
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Malaysia, France, Portugal and South Africa. 69

Nevertheless,

other than the two superpowers, only France, West Germany, Japan
and China demonstrate an active interest in the region.

France,

with its base at Djibouti, maintains the largest standing naval
force of any western state outside of the United States.

West

Germany periodically sends a few ships to the Indian Ocean to show
her flag as well.

Japan is an interesting case given its

overwhelming dependence on mid-east oil to fuel its highly
technological economy.

Japan imports 85% of its oil and 70% of its

iron from the Indian Ocean.

Also, fully one half of Japanls

foreign trade utilizes Indian Ocean sea lanes.
After World War II Japan abolished her military at the
insistence of the

u.s.

The Self-Defense Force replaced the

traditional army and navy.

In practice, this force is designed to

help protect Japan from overt aggression.
very capable.

The force is small but

The Maritime Self-Defense Force could, in case of a

threat to Japanese lifelines, be employed in the Indian Ocean.

In

1971 Japan supported the U.N. Zone of Peace proclamation, but
increasing worry about the intentions of the Soviet Union has led
to a quiet withdrawal of support.

Hence, it is quite conceivable

that threatening events could lead to Japan's pursuit of an active
Indian Ocean policy.70
It is unlikely that the littoral states are ready to accept a
Zone of Peace either.

MAs one participant after another pointed

out, the littoral states have never looked at the area as a single
geopolitical unit, and thus have no experience in regional
cooperation.- 71 Indeed, many of these poor states are vehemently
opposed to any plan that could lead to their own demilitarization
or nonmilitarization.

The political instability of many littoral
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nations encourages them to arm.

Unstable, and often abusive

governments depend on arms to maintain their power while more
stable governments rely on weapons to protect them from avaricious
neighbors.

The Zone of Peace proposal was directed towards the

superpowers.

As the following table illustrates, a policy of arms

limitations will be ineffective as long as other states are willing
to fill the void:
Arms Transfers to the Indian Ocean Littoral and Hinterland States (SNMN)

1971

1972

1973

1974
_.

1975

1976

1977

1625

2455

3355

4250

4065

5935

8180

Arms Transfers to Indian Ocean States by Source

USA

USSR

FRANCE

UK

FRG

DRG

OTHERS

11831

6650

1975

1525

755

335

2700
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The U.N. resolution to establish a Zone of Peace received
unanimous littoral support.

Many of these nations support peace,

but only in terms of the superpower they are allied with.

For

instance, many of the states see the Soviet naval presence as
vital in the struggle to maintain peace.

How else, they argue,

could they be assured of protection from U.S. Hgunboat H
diplomacy?

Governments friendly to Russia also appreciate Soviet

naval presence based on the presumption that these elements are
available to intervene if domestic difficulties threaten the
ruler1s vital interests. 7 3

Other nations, such as Kenya,

support the Zone of Peace but see U.S. involvement in the region
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oS stabilizing.

UPrivately, Kenyans recognize the need for a

United States presence in the Indian Ocean to match that of the
Soviet Union. 74
The littoral states are mired in poverty.

Climate, history

and social factors, not to mention corrupt and inefficient
leaders, all playa part in the poor economic condition of many
Indian Ocean states.

While many outside nations provide aid, much

of it being nonmilitary, little progress is apparent.

Ultimately,

there is not enough wealth in the world to substantially raise the
standard of living for many poor countries.

The east-west battle

in the Indian Ocean is designed to encourage political alignment;
the carrot being economic aid.

Economic aid continues to flow

into the region but an improved standard of living is an elusive
goal.

One way to encourage peace may be to simply teach people to

glean satisfaction from the lifestyle available.

uExperiments are

being made in Indonesia with new methods of village education, and
ways of developing a new lifestyle which will provide status and
satisfaction without depending on western-level symbols and
consumption.

In the end, such indigenous initiatives may prove to

be more important for the stability of the area than any made by
outside powers. u7 5 In theory this might work, but the third
world wants economic parity and would never accept this answer.
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Littoral State Classification by Alignment
Pro-West
Australia
Israel
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Onan
U.A.E.
Qutan
Bahrain
Kuwait
Malaysia
Singapore
Indonesia
Djibouti
N. Yemen

Pro-Russia
Ethiopia
Jordan
Iraq
S. Yemen

Pro-Chinal
Tanzania
Somalia

Nonaligned or Unclassified
Iran
India
Burma
Sri Lanka
Mozambique
Madagascar
Kenya
Sudan
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Comdros
Reunion
Maldives
Seychelles
Maritius

LOCAL CONFLICTS

To write about local conflicts in full would require volumes.
Yet these local wars illustrate what fragile concepts both peace
and alignment are amongst the littoral states.

Two examples were

selected to highlight local conflicts: the Iran-Iraq war because it
is ongoing; and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict because it is a
classic example of a local conflict with outside intervention that
resulted in a complete realignment.
Saddam Hussein launched his attack on Iran for the stated
reason for recovering territory and restoring navigational rights
on the Shatt-al-Arab in order to guarantee Iraqi access to the
Persian Gulf.

Yet, from " ... a geopolitical viewpoint, episodic

fighting between the region's competing Mesopotamian and Persian
powers has characterized the area's history for millenia. u7 6
Iran's Ayatollah has vowed not to surrender until, among other
demands, Hussein is removed as Iraq's head of state.

The Ayatollah

has never forgiven Hussein for forcing him from Iraq while he was
living there in exile.

Thus, the two states continue to wage a war
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in which thousands have been killed or wounded, with no sign that
peace is at hand.
When the war first started, most observers felt the more
militarized Iraq would win a qUick victory.

Iran has proved more

resilient than most believed possible, having to depend on massive
waves of troops to overwhelm the better-armed Iraqui fighters.
"Once again, the resiliency of third world revolutionary movements
is evident.

A weak economy, massive unemployment, inflation, food

shortages, internal unrest and invasion have swept over Iran like
the Seven Biblical Plagues.

Yet the Ayatollah's battered regime

still stands."77
Perhaps a more poignant example is provided by the change of
alliances in Ethiopia and Somalia .

Prior to 1975 Ethiopia was

aligned with the United States while Somalia sided with the Soviet
Union.

In 1975 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launched an

attack on Ethiopian forces in an attempt to initiate a communist
insurgency.

The Ethiopians were forced to retreat and the United

States stopped sending aid to Ethiopia.

At the same time the

Soviets supported the ELF as they wanted to aid all attempts to
enhance the growth of Marxist states.

The situation was static,

with the exception of the war, until 1977.

With Russia supporting

both Ethiopia and Somalia, the latter recognized the possibility of
seizing more territory and " ... the Somalian government attempted to
take advantage of Ethiopian instability by launching their July
1977 invasion of the Ogaden in a classic example of nationalist
irredentism."78
The Soviet Union decided to support the Ethiopian revolution
and halted all aid to Somalia .

In 1978 Ethiopia, formerly an ally

with the United States, was now siding with the Soviet Union.
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Somalia, formerly an ally with the Soviet Union, was now being
aided by China.

The United States also kept its influence in the

area by commencing an aid program with Kenya.

Thus, a small civil

war led to a complete realignment of big power support within two
years.
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The problems of establishing a Zone of Peace in the Indian
Ocean are apparently insurmountable.
countervailing political maneuver.

The area is a vortex of
Additionally, local nationalism

and racism playa major part in creating tension in the region.
The superpowers have displayed no indication to depart the area and
China appears to be building up to make her presence felt as well.
In terms of China and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean is
clearly the area of the world in which both states feel is the
greatest opportunity for expanding their power.

"The Indian Ocean

comprises most of the third world, which both Peking and Moscow see
as a most important arena of their struggles, and in which they
have both sought to enlist allies against each other under the
pretext of helping them emancipate themselves from the political
and economic hegemony of the west. N7 9 Given the mutual historic
distrust of these two nations, it defies logic to consider either
state as willing to leave the littoral states alone.

The doctrine

of communism compels them to pursue their revolutionary practices
with each supporting a different brand of communism.
The United States is not going to abandon the region primarily
because of its importance as an oil and mineral route.

America is

also painfully aware that the Soviet Union land mass is quite close
to the Indian Ocean.

The invasion of Afghanistan also suggests

that the Soviets are actively pursuing their goal to establish a
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permanent base in the Indian Ocean.

While this would cripple their

argument against the permanence of the base on Diego Garcia, the
Soviets have never sacrificed territorial gains for political
damage.

In fact, a major reason why the U.S. never agreed to arms

limitations in the region was for fear of Soviet-backed
revolution.

While no Soviet troops may be employed in places like

Angola, the Cuban forces present are clearly receiving their orders
from Moscow.

In that context, U.S. forces become a necessity as do

arms sales to friendly nations.
At the same time the United States is somewhat constrained by
public opinion .

The base at Diego Garcia provides a vital signal

of permanence but would not be large enough to provide support if
the Soviets were to take a major military action.

Yet, history

indicates that the Soviets would be unwilling to take action
against even small U.S. elements.

Consequently, it is probable

that the base will provide the friendly littoral states with
reassurance about a U.S. commitment in an emergency as well as send
a signal to the Soviets that America considers the Indian Ocean an
important region .
The littoral states all raise a common voice to big power
presence, but in some fashion most favor one superpower over the
other.

Coupled with that are the incredible problems facing the

governments of the lesser developed states.

Ill-prepared for

self-rule, many nations were thrust into difficult positions with
the end of colonial rule.

uIf the big powers are too strong to

fight, the small ones are--by their very weakness, lack of
cohesion, and balkanization--likely to be the cause or scene of all
kinds of 'destabilizing' violence, ranging from delinquency,
organized crime, piracy (with or without political cover), riots,
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guerilla warfare, and full-scale replays of World War II tank
battles and air battles."BO
The Islamic states are also fractured by rivalry.

Despite

their stated unity and obvious opulence they are generally
backward.
common.

Military coups, revolutions and political upheavals are
Some Islamic states are pro-west, some pro-Soviet, some

pro-China, and some are nonaligned.

The end result is that the

Islamic states are as likely to erupt in violence as any of the
poorer littoral nations.

"Ethnic and regional factors exert a

divisive influence despite religious affinity.

The conflict

between Bangladesh and Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia, and Pakistan and
Afghanistan confirm this view."SI
As with historical situations, areas with an absence of power
are quickly filled by powerful states with conflicting interests.
In the Indian Ocean the two most compelling interests are
represented:

economic and politico-strategic.

Consequently, while

the Soviet Union and the United States are not going to abandon the
region, it is also highly doubtful that either nation will cease
selling arms to friendly littoral nations.
The actual presence of the big powers is likely to remain
essentially maritime.

"Naval forces on two opposing sides will

probably act as a restraint on each other.

It is not true that

only major quantities of force can have a political effect, or that
armed forces are only relevant to a state of war.· S2 Naval
forces have operated very near to one another without leading to a
confrontation.

In the October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict there

were 70 U.S. ships and 100 Soviet ships together in the relatively
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smaller Mediterranean Sea.

"Indeed, it could be argued more

plausibly that it was precisely this kind of naval stand-off that
prevented a local conflict from getting out of hand, and spurred
efforts by the superpowers to find a solution to the crises."83
Another factor to consider in the Indian Ocean is the peculiar
position of the two superpowers.

There is no doubt that they are

rivals, but on a separate plane they also have formed a reluctant
alliance.

Both nations continually strive to improve their

strategic balance while together opposing the Zone of Peace and
working to maintain traditional freedom of navigation.

In the

Iran-Iraq war both nations are quietly waiting for a stalemate; in
large part to maintain the strategic balance.

These common

intp.rests further limit the possibility of big power withdrawal
from the region.

If they were to abandon the ocean to the littoral

nations, the likelihood of a power vortex with South Africa, India,
Pakistan and Australia competing for local hegemony seems
inp.vttable.

Lastly, "Some experts argue that the obvious point

about the growth of superpowers' activities in the Indian Ocean is
that the world is becoming, or has already become, a single
straLegic state."84
EROSPECTS FOR A ZONE OF

P~ACE

Having reviewed the Zone of Peace movement in the Indian Ocean,
it becomes possible to analyze the possibility of this type of
pronouncement being accepted in any area of the world.

By

reviewing the U.N. declamation, it will become clear that serious
problems manifest themselves.

It seems impossible that the Indian

Ocean will become a peace zone in the foreseeable future.
proposal itself is filled with problems as well.
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The

The first aspect of the resolution sought to render the Indian
Ocean a nuclear-free zone.

The proposal was obviously directed at

the two superpowers, although to a lesser extent it was probably
designed to deter any nation capable of deploying nuclear weapons
from doing so as well.

The definition of nuclear-free in regards

to the littoral and hinterland states was not made clear.
Specifically, is it the ocean alone or all the states that border
it that are to be nuclear free?

If it was to include the littoral

states, India would certainly object as she is currently working to
expand domestic nuclear capability.
Secondly, the proposal demanded that outside powers eliminate,
reduce, restrict or halt further military expansion.

Additionally,

the proposal called for the elimination " ... from the Indian Ocean
(of) all bases, military installations and logistical supply
facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence
in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power
rivalry."

This last qualifying phrase seems to leave open the

possibility that military bases and installations and nuclear
weapons that are established by local states in a context other
than that of Great Power rivalry will be consistent with the idea
of a Zone of Peace.
It has been established that the United States, Russia, and
other countries with an interest in the future of the Indian Ocean
are not going to abandon the area.

Furthermore, it can be asked by

what legal or moral principle any group of states may attempt to
assert an exclusive right to the high seas.
The problems experienced by the littoral states in attempting
to force a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean are not unique.
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There

is no area in the world today in which there is no competition for
control. or at least the right to establish a presence.

Even

Antarctica is soon to be hotly contested when the current treaty
expires.

Consequently. without a fundamental change in human

nature. Zones of Peace will remain philosophical dreams.
In the case of the superpowers it is clear that they are
unwilling to abandon areas perceived as vital to their own
security.

Given the complexity of international relations. it

would be foolish policy to leave entire regions free to decide for
themselves the future political alignment. or be influenced by
other powers who are present in an area.

Our age is no different

from any that have preceded it. and trusting one's enemy is not a
policy followed by nations with long histories.
A more dramatic indictment of the Zone of Peace movement is
embodied in the false reasoning of the resolution itself.

The

assumption that big power presence is destabilizing is false.

The

superpowers take advantage of local politics and attempt to
consolidate their positions. but they do not instigate the desire
for change.

Small states are as capable of waging war as large

ones. albeit on a smaller scale.

The possibility that nations will

stop their efforts to gain more territory or expand their influence
is remote. and no Zone of Peace is possible unless all nations
abandon the option of employing arms to achieve national goals.
Lastly. all states with a naval capacity will continue to use
that force in an effort to gain influence and protect their
strategic positions.

A naval force can travel anywhere on short

notice. establish a presence. yet never violate the sanctity of
another nation's territory.

The traditional freedom of the high
-39-

seas coupled with the relative ease of naval deployments. assumes
the continued use of this type of power projection.

Political

alliances. local and regional conflicts. and freedom of the seas
combine to make the concept of a Zone of Peace unfeasible. if not
impossible.
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